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EVIDENCE - IDENTIFICATION BY
VoicE.-[Pennsylvania] One Stratigoes was robbed in his place of
business by three men who immediately thereafter blinded him,
apparently merely to prevent subsequent identification. Four months
later defendants were arrested on
suspicion of other crimes not connected with the one in question.
A "show up" was conducted at the
police station, and Stratigoes, after
hearing the voices of a number of
persons, identified those of defendants as belonging to the men who
had injured him. Defendants were
indicted for mayhem and robbery.
The only evidence for the state was
an account of the identification of
defendants through their voices.
There was no evidence that the
voices in question had any peculiar characteristics. No examination was held in open court to test
the accuracy of the identification.
Defendants introduced considerable evidence tending to prove
alibis.
A conviction resulted,
which was reversed by the appellate court. Held: Evidence of identification by voice alone is dangerous evidence. As developed by the
prosecution it does not seem sufficiently substantial to support a
conviction, particularly in view of
the well substantiated alibis on the
part of both defendants. Corn-

monwealth v. Derembeis, 182 Atl.
85 (Pa. 1935).
Identification of an accused person as the guilty party is as essential as proof of the corpus delicti in
every crime. Booker v. State, 76
Ala. 22 (1885); People v. Nelson,
85 Cal. 421, 24 Pac. 1006 (1890);
State v. Powers, 72 Vt. 168, 47 Atl.
830 (1900).
Generally speaking,
the identification of the accused as
the guilty party may be shown
through any means by which the
particular individuality can be differentiated from that of every
other individuality. Mclnerney v.
United States, 143 Fed. 729 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1906). Witnesses have been
allowed to base their conclusions
on a number of considerations:
appearance, Brown v. Commonwealth, 187 Ky. 829, 220 S. W. 1052
(1920); size, Hogan v. Commonwealth, 212 Ky. 813, 280 S. W. 104
(1926); voice, Orr v. State, 225 Ala.
642, 144 So. 867 (1932); Pennington v. State, 91 Fla. 446, 107 So.
331 (1926); Ogden v. People, 134
Ill. 599, 25 N. E. 755 (1890); Deal
v. State, 140 Ind. 354, 39 N. E. 930
(1895); Dorchester Trust Co. v.
Casey, 268 Mass. 494, 176 N. E. 178
(1929); State v. Berezuk, 331 Mo.
626, 55 S. W. (2d) 949 (1932);
handwriting, State v. Hauptman,
180 AtL 809 (N. J. 1935); State v.
Manley, 211 Iowa 1043, 233 N. W.
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110 (1930); palm prints, State v.
Dunn, 161 La. 532, 109 So. 56
(1926); finger prints, People v.
Roach, 215 N. Y. 592, 109 N. E. 618
(1915); State v. Combs, 200 N. C.
671, 158 S. E. 252 (1931); State v.
Witzell, 175 Wash. 146, 26 Pac. (2d)
1049 (1933); footprints, People v.
Searcey, 121 Cal. 1, 53 Pac. 359
(1898); People v. Buckner, 281 II.
340, 117 N. E. 1027 (1917). See 1
WicMopx, EVIDENCE (2d. ed. 1923)
757, 758, 760.
In any case where the sufficiency
of identification evidence is in
question the court must consider
four things: (1) The intrinsic reliability of the evidence in question, (2) the opportunity of the
witness to make his observations,
(3) the qualifications of the witness to observe and give his opinion on the particular type of evidence in question, (4) corroborating circumstances. Further than
this it is difficult to generalize, and
each case must be decided on its
own facts.
Perhaps the most reliable and
exact of all identification evidence
is that relating to finger prints.
Where identity has been the important issue at a trial, courts of
review have taken judicial notice
of the fact that no two finger prints
are alike, and have not been reluctant to affirm convictions based
on the testimony of finger print
experts alone. Castleton's Case, 3
Crim. App. 74 (1909); Parker v.
The King, 14 Comm. L. R. 681
(1912); State v. Connors, 87 N. J.
L. 419, 94 Atl. 812 (1915); Smith
v. State, 54 Okla. Cr. Rep. 236,
18 P. (2d) 282 (1933). Accord:
Braley v. State, 54 Okla. Cr.
Rep. 219, 18 P. (2d) 281 (1932);
State v. Johnson, 37 N. M. 280, 21
P. (2d) 813 (1933); State v. Wit-

zell, supra. The same attitude is
taken toward palmprints. State v.
Dunn, supra; State v. Kuhl, 42
Nev. 185, 175 Pac. 190 (1918);
State v. Lapan, 101 Vt. 124, 141
See People v.
Atl. 686 (1928).
Les, 267 Mich. 648, 656, 255 N. W.
407, 410 (1934), where the court
says: "We are satisfied that finger
prints and palm prints are a more
certain and exact method of identification than a comparison of hair
and eyes, height, weight and even
physical defects. Their use affords more protection to the innocent man than do the more usual
modes of identification."
Some courts have shown a tendency to distrust handwriting evidence even when given by experts, and cautionary instructions
to the jury in this regard have
been held proper. State v. Manley, supra; State v. Van Tassel, 103
Iowa 6, 72 N. W. 497 (1897). But
see State v. Hauptman, supra,
where the conviction was affirmed
despite the fact that the trial judge
had refused to instruct the jury
that the opinion of handwriting
experts is proof of "low degree."
Types of evidence other than
those already referred to shade off
into varying degrees of unreliability. Evidence as to appearance,
size and various physical peculiarities is less substantial and reliable
and entitled to less weight, primarly because it is so often based on
mere opinion formed from very
Brown v.
casual observations.
Commonwealth, Hogan v. Commonwealth, supra. On the very
same facts, persons equally honest
and equally intelligent may often
draw contrary conclusions and
mere positiveness of opinion does
not change the actual fact. While
evidence of trailing by blood-
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hounds is admissible (State v.
Evans, 115 Kan. 538, 224 Pac. 492
(1924)), it is generally held that
this class of evidence is merely
cumulative or corroborative, and
not sufficient of itself to support a
conviction. Copley v. State, 153
Tenn. 189, 281 S. W. 460 (1926).
When it comes to the question
of identification by voice, courts
are faced with the most hazardous
and unreliable type of identity
evidence. The court in State v.
Karas, 43 Utah 506, 136 Pac. 788
(1913), indicates that most courts
will require that testimony of
recognition of the voice of a person should be reasonably positive
and certain, and based upon some
peculiarity of the person's voice, or
upon sufficient preyious knowledge
by the witness of such person's
voice. Accord: Patton v. State,
117 Ga. 230, 43 S. E. 523 (1903);
Givens v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. Rep.
562, 34 S. W. 626 (1896); Andrews
v. Commonwealth, 100 Va. 801, 40
S. E. 935 (1902). Courts have said
that a witness may testify that
statements made over the telephone were statements of the accused, where the witness is able
to recognize the voice. State v.
Usher, 136 Iowa 606, 111 N. W. 811
(1907); People v. Strollo, 191 N.
Y. 42, 83 N. E. 473 (1908). A witness who has overheard a conversation between the accused and the
deceased may describe the tone of
voice used as angry or pleasant
Campos v. State, 50 Tex. Cr.
Rep. 289, 97 S. W. 100 (1906).
However, in both of these situations he is subject to the qualifications set forth above.
It is possible to criticize the court
in the instant case in view of the
fact that the complaining witness
several times positively identified
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the voices of defendants from a
large group of persons at the police
"show up." See People v. Martin,
304 Ill. 494, 136 N. E. 711 (1922);
People v. DeSuno, 354 Ill. 387, 188
N. E. 466 (1933). On the other
hand, it should be remembered
that human senses and memory
are faulty at best. See Brown,
An Experience in Identification
Testimony (1934) 25 J. Crim. L.
621. In this case the court was
dealing with identification by voice,
the flimsiest and least reliable of
all identification evidence. It was
not even shown that the voices of
defendants were in any way peculiar or unusual. The identifying witness had not heard the defendants' voices before the time
of the crime or afterwards until
the police "show up." It should
be further noted that voice and
voice alone was relied upon. The
witness, being blind, was unable to
identify defendants by their appearance. There were no corroborating circumstances, but on
the contrary, defendants presented
well substantiated alibis. Such
evidence should be received with
care. Viewing the case as a whole,
it is difficult to say that the court's
decision was unwarranted.
LYLE E. PEacE.
FoRmR JEOPARDY - WAIVER BY
HABEAS CORPus - SUNDAY JUDG-

mENT.-[New York] The relator's
trial for disorderly conduct commenced Saturday before a police
magistrate and a jury, but he was
not found guilty and sentenced.
until Sunday. Asserting that the
sentence was void because entered
on Sunday he obtained a discharge on a writ of habeas corpus.
Upon again being charged with
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the same offense on the same information he alleged that he had
already been placed in jeopardy
because of the first trial, and upon
this ground he obtained a discharge on a second writ of habeas
corpus. The Appellate Division reversed the order of the Special
Term sustaining this second discharge. 281 N. Y. S. 86 (1935).
On appeal, reversed and the order
sustaining the discharge affirmed.
Held: The former trial placed the
relator in jeopardy and he could
not be retried for the same offense,
notwithstanding the fact that the
court had no jurisdiction to sentence him on Sunday. One judge
dissented, asserting that the relator
had waived his jeopardy by having the conviction set aside through
his own initiative. People ex rel.
Meyer v. Warden of Nassau County
Jail, 269 N. Y 426, 199 N. E. 647
(1936).
At common law courts were forbidden to function on Sunday.
Swann v. Broome, 3 Burr. 1595, 97
Eng. Rep. 999 (1764). In several
states this rule still obtains, and it
has been held that judgments entered on Sunday are void. Higgenbotham v. State, 88 Fla. 26, 101 So.
233 (1924); Devault v. Sampson,
114 Kan. 913, 221 Pac. 284 (1923)
(judgment entered on plea of guilty); Ex Parte Thompson v. Sanders, 334 Mo. 1100, 70 S. W. (2d)
1051 (1934); Moss v. State, 131
Tenn. 94, 173 S. W. 859 (1915).
This rule has long been confirmed
in New York. N. Y. CoNsoL. LAws
(Cahill, 1930) c. 31, §5; People v.
Luhrs, 29 N. Y. S. 789 (1894); People ex. rel. Martineau v. Brunnell,
236 N. Y. S. 586 (1929), noted
(1930) 15 Corn. L. Q. 288. But
judgments may be entered on Sunday on a plea of guilty. N. Y.
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Laws (1930) c. 602; People v.
Wells, 276 N. Y. S. 543 (1934).
In the present case, the former
judgment being void and jeopardy
having attached when the relator
was arraigned and the jury sworn
(People ex. rel. Pulko v. Murphy,
280 N. Y. S. 405 (1935)), habeas
corpus was a proper remedy to
raise the question of double jeopardy when he was charged with
the same offense the second time.
Bens v. United States, 266 Fed. 152
(C. C. A. 2d, 1920), cert. denied,
254 U. S. 634 (1920); People ex
rel Cohen v. Collins, 265 N. Y. S.
475 (1933). But the fact that jeopardy has once attached does not
necessarily preclude a new trial in
every case. A new trial is not
barred when the jury is discharged
in cases of manifest necessity. 1
WHARTON, CamiNAL LAW (9th ed.
1923) §§998 (3), 1035. Similarly,
where the verdict of the first trial
is a nullity, a second trial may be
had. Houston v. United States, 5
F. (2d) 497 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925);
Allen v. State, 13 Okla. Cr. Rep.
533, 165 Pac. 745 (1917). Where
the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the trial, a
defendant cannot plead double
jeopardy. Peterson v. State, 79
Neb. 132, 112 N. W. 306 (1907);
Rudd v. Hazzard, 259 N. Y. S. 18
(1932). The present case, as the
dissent points out, is similar to
those in which a court has lost
jurisdiction because the term ended
before the verdict was rendered.
In re Scrafford, 21 Kan. 527 (1879);
State v. Jeffers, 64 Mo. 376 (1877).
A new trial was granted in these
cases. In the instant case the trial
was proper and valid up to the
time the court lost jurisdiction by
holding over into Sunday, and it
would not seem unreasonable to
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conclude that a new trial could be
had.
But the dissent is not strictly accurate in saying that the relator
waived his plea of double jeopardy
by instituting proceedings on his
own initiative to challenge the
legality of his conviction, because
the waiver doctrine is generally
applied to cases where an appeal
or writ of error is used to set aside
the conviction. The doctrine rests
upon the principle that a defendant who by his own act brings
about a retrial in place of his conviction, cannot be heard to say he
is then placed in double jeopardy,
and thus go unpunished. See dissenting opinion, 199 N. E. at 650.
To petition for habeas corpus in
such a case is not to ask for a
retrial, but is to deny the courts
jurisdiction to hear the case at all.
However, this reasoning has been
applied even when habeas corpus
has been used, and the technical
distinctions between habeas corpus
and appeal or writ of error have
been disregarded. Bryant v. United
States, 214 Fed. 51 (C. C. A. 8th,
1914); Marshall v. State, 73 Tex.
Cr. Rep. 531, 534, 166 S. W. 722,
724, 1915A L. R. A. 526. Under the
circumstances of the present case
a practical solution would have
been to allow a new trial to determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused, instead of releasing
him to go free.
Russi.i, PAcARD.

FOURTENmH A mmrN - DuE
PRocEss - CoNVIcTIoN BASED ox
INVOLuNTARY CoNrEssioN.--:[Fed-

eral] Defendants, three negroes,
were coerced by torture of the

most brutal nature, in which several deputy sheriffs participated, to

confess to the commission of a
homicide. They were indicted for
murder. Counsel were hurriedly
appointed. After a preliminary examination, the trial court admitted
the confessions in evidence, and
a conviction followed. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed, holding that defendants
should have requested the exclusion of the confessions and that
the withdrawal of the privilege
against self-incrimination is not a
denial of due process. Brown v.
State, 173 Miss. 542, 158 So. 339,
161 So. 465 (1935). On certiorari
to the United States Supreme
Court, reversed. Held: Convictions which rest solely upon confessions shown to have been brutally extorted by state officers are
inconsistent with the due process
of law required by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Brown v. Mississippi,
56 S. Ct. 461 (1936).
A state criminal proceeding, perhaps more than any other, is a
matter of purely local as distinguished from national concern.
Nevertheless, it is well established
that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is a definite limitation on state powers in
this regard. Cf. Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908) (the
privileges and immunities clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not restrict the state in its conduct of a criminal trial). Recently
the Supreme Court has shown a
tendency toward more frequent intervention in these matters. See
Nutting, The Supreme Court, The
Fourteenth Amendment and State
Criminal Trials (1936) 3 Chi. L.
Rev. 244. The instant case following as it does closely upon the
famous Scottsboro decisions (Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932);
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Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587
(1935); Patterson v. Alabama, 294
U. S. 600 (1935)), confirms this
tendency and serves once more to
focus interest on the supervisory
power of the United States Supreme Court over state criminal
proceedings.
A review of the state proceeding may be obtained, as in the instant case, by writ of certiorari
from the Supreme Court to the
state court of last resort. Powell
v. Alabama, supra. A second
method of obtaining review by the
federal courts is by petition for
habeas corpus, either in the federal
district court (Downes v. Dunaway, 53 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 5th,
1931)), or originally in the Supreme Court.
See Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U. S. 340 (1935).
Before this writ will be granted,
however, it must appear that all
remedies in the state courts have
been exhausted. Hale v. Crawford,
65 F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933);
Mooney v. Holohan, supra (petititioner must not only have appealed to the highest state court
but he must have petitioned for
habeas corpus in a state court);
Comment (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev.
404. The accused may also remove from the state to the federal
district court if he is denied the
federal right by a state statutory
or constitutional provision. This
procedure has been strictly limited
(Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313
(1879)) and has been little used
in recent years.
The Supreme Court has shown
extreme reluctance, except in cases
where the violation of federal
rights is apparent, to exercise its
supervisory power over state criminal procedure. The Court's attitude is well expressed by Justice
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Holmes in Ashe v. Valotta, 270 U.
S. 424, 426 (1926): "In so delicate a matter as interrupting the
regular administration of the criminal law of the State-too much
discretion cannot be used, and it
must be realized that it can be
done only upon definitely and narrowly limited grounds." The details of state procedure will not
be interfered with. As was said in
Frank v. Magnum, 237 U. S. 309,
340 (1915), "Repeated decisions of
this court have put it beyond the
range of further debate that the
'due process' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has not the effect of imposing on the states any
particular form or mode of procedure, so long as the essential
rights of notice and a hearing, or
the opportunity to be heard, before
a competent tribunal are not interfered with." Thus it was held in
Hurtado v. California,110 U. S. 516
(1884), that to proceed by information rather than by a grand jury's
indictment was not to deny due
process. In Maxwell v. Dow, 176
U. S. 581 (1900), it was indicated
that a state might constitutionally
do away with trial by jury. Twining v. New Jersey, supra, established that the Fourteenth Amendment does not secure to an accused the privilege against selfincrimination or limit the states in
the same manner that the first
eight Amendments to the Constitution limit the federal government.
Although the right to be present at
the trial seems to be an element
of due process (see Hoyt v. Utah,
110 U. S. 574 (1883)), defendant
must show that his absence worked
a substantial injury to his cause.
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S.
97 (1933) (defendant was not present at yiew), noted (1934 24 J.
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Crim. L. 1102. Presence when the
jury returns its verdict is not essential if the defendant waived the
right. Frank v. Magnum, supra.
It is difficult to say, except in
the most general terms, what constitutes a denial of due process by
the state court.
The Supreme
Court will look at the whole case
and will not interfere unless it appears that the state trial has been
grossly unfair and the accused has
been deprived of some fundamental
right. See Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.
S. 425, 434 (1905); Herbert v.
Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316
(1926).
Systematic exclusion of
negroes from jury service has been
held a denial of due process. Neal
v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1880);
Norris v. Alabama, supra; Note
(1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 776. See
Comment (1934) 29 II. L. Rev.
498. A judge cannot constitutionally have a direct pecuniary interest in a conviction. Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U. S. 510 (1927). Following a
suggestion made in Frank v. Magnum, supra, the Court has held
that mob domination of a state
trial renders that trial a nullity
and contravenes the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U. S. 86 (1923). Similarly, a
conviction based on perjured testimony intentionally used by the
prosecuting attorney cannot stand.
Mooney v. Holohan, supra, noted
(1935) 35 Col L. Rev. 282, (1935)
25 J. Crim. L. 943. Where ignorant negroes were rushed through a
trial to a conviction without the
benefit of counsel they were held to
have been denied due process.
Powell v. Alabama, supra; Note
(1933) 23 J. Crim. L. 841; Comment (1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 245.
A state statute permitting conviction for syndicalism without sup-
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porting evidence has met with the
Court's displeasure (Fisk v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 510 (1927)), as has
an arbitrary presumption against
the accused raised by a statute
making criminal the leasing of
lands to aliens. Morrison v. California, 291 U. S. 82 (1933); Comment (1934) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 102.
See generally Nutting, supra.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi dismissed the constitutional
objections in the instant case on
the technical ground that, even if
the admission of the forced confessions constituted a withdrawal
of the privilege against self-incrimation, the Fourteenth Amendment was not contravened. But
the United States Supreme Court
properly refused to consider the
case on any such narrow issue.
"That complaint," it said, at 465,
"is not of the commission of mere
error, but of a wrong so fundamental that it made the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial
and rendered the conviction and
sentence wholly void." Again it
said, "The rack and the torture
chamber may not be substituted
for the witness stand. . . . It
would be difficult to conceive of
methods more revolting to the
sense of justice than those taken to
procure the confessions of these
petitioners, and the use of the confessions so obtained was a clear
denial of due process." The stock
objections to Supreme Court action
in these cases, viz., that it infringes
on state sovereignty, that it is a
means of delay, and that it will
cast an undue burden on the Supreme Court by a multiplicity of
suits seem insignificant as one
reads this decision.
Admitting
that such inconveniences exist,
they would seem to be more than
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justified by such a salutory result
as was reached in this case. As
long as such conditions as are described in this decision can exist
in the administration of justice by
the states, a supervisory power in
the Supreme Court is both desirable and necessary.
C. IVES WALDO, JR.

CONSPIRAcY-EvIDENCE NECESSARY

TO SUSTAIN CONVICTIO.-[Federal]
One Nash, who had escaped from
the federal prison at Leavenworth
was apprehended by federal agents
and was being returned to prison
when three gangsters, armed with
machine guns, attempted to effect
his escape. In the ensuing fray
three police officers, the prisoner,
and one federal agent were killed.
Defendants, although they did not
participate in the attack were
charged with conspiracy to violate a federal law providing that:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to procure the escape of any
prisoner properly committed to the
custody of the Attorney General
or to advise, connive at, aid, or
assist in such escape, or to conceal
any such prisoner after such escape." 46 STAT. 327 (1930), 18 U.
S. C. A. §753 (i) (1935). The evidence tended to show that all of
the defendants, some of whom were
women, had been closely associated with the outlaws who committed the actual murders, and that
they had rendered assistance to
Nash during the time he was at
large. It was shown that all of
the defendants were of bad character. Evidence was introduced to
show that defendants made telephone calls to the place of the murders shortly before they occurred.
Defendants were convicted. On

appeal, affirmed. Held: Conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
The evidence is
sufficient to'sustain the conviction.
Galatas v. United States, 80 F. (2d)
15 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935). [Certiorari
denied, 56 S. Ct. 574 (1936).]
The term "conspirators" apparently originated in the ordinance of
33 EDw. I (1274) which was directed against "confederacy and
alliance for the false and malicious
promotion of indictments and pleas,
etc." Blackstone defined it as the
"crime where two or more conspire
to indict an innocent man of felony falsely and maliciously, who
is accordingly indicted and acquitted." Digby, Law of Criminal
Conspiracy in England and Ireland (1890) 6 L. Q. Rev. 129,
130. But, in the Poulterer'scase, 9
Co. Rep. 55 (1611), the Star Chamber held that an agreement for
a conspiracy was itself indictable,
whether the conspiracy was actually carried out or not. This
concept of conspiracy was expanded and frequently used by the
later English courts. WRImH, LAW
OF

CammAL

AGREEMENTS

CONSPIRACIRS

(1873)

8.

In

AND

fact,

combinations designed to effect any
ends which were generally considered unjust or pernicious were
at first regarded as criminal conspiracies. Digby, supra at 134.
The reason conspiracies were made
criminal was generally due to the
danger to the public, or to individuals, because of the increased
power which resulted from the
combination. State v. Dalton, 134
Mo. App. 517, 114 S. W. 1132
(1908);

2 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW

(9th ed. 1923) 180; Holdsworth,
Conspiracy and Abuse of Legal
Process (1921) 37 L. Q. Rev.
467. It is now the well-established
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common law rule that the crime is
committed when there is an agreement to do an "unlawful act, or
to do a lawful act by unlawful
means." Lord Denman in Jones
case, 110 Eng. Rep. 485, 487 (1832).
This doctrine continued in use
notwithstanding the fact that Denman had apparently repudiated it.
See Regina v. Peck, 112 Eng. Rep.
1372, 1374 (1839). Many American states follow the common law
rule that the unlawful agreement
in itself completes the offense and
that an overt act is not necessary.
People v. Cohen, 358 II. 326, 198
N. E. 150 (1934); Garland.v. State,
112 Md. 83, 75 Atl. 631 (1910);
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 229
Pa. 609, 79 Atl. 222 (1911); Smith
v. State, 8 Ala. App. 187, 62 So.
575 (1913); State v. Dalton, supra.
Some state statutes, however, require an overt act. People v. Miles,
108 N. Y. S. 510 (1908); People v.
Johnson, 22 Cal. App. 362, 134 Pac.
339 (1913).
In the federal courts the prosecution must show an overt act to
complete the federal offense of
conspiracy. 35 STAT. 1096 (1909), 18
U. S. C. A. 88 (1927); United States
v. Hirsch, 100 U. S. 33 (1879);
Hyde v. Shine, 199 U. S. 62, 76
(1905); Hyde v. United Scates, 225
U. S. 347, 359 (1912). Further, it
has been held that to constitute a
conspiracy against the United
States the object of. the unlawful
agreement must be the commission
of some offense against the United
States in the sense only that it
must be some act made an offense
by the laws of the United States.
United States v. Lyman, 190 Fed.
414 (D. C. Ore., 1911); Heike v.
United States, 227 U. S. 131 (1913).
The only case, other than the instant one, that has arisen under
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18 U. S. C. A. §753 (i) (1930) is

Hale v. United States, 65 F. (2d)
673 (1933). There, defendant was
convicted of conspiracy to aid a
prisoner to escape from a federal
penitentiary by "smuggling in" to
him some saws which he used to
effect his escape. The evidence of
the government was largely circumstantial, but the conviction was
sustained on the ground that it was
for the jury to decide the weight
to be given to the evidence and
witnesses. In the instant case the
court said, "conspiracy is rarely
susceptible of direct and positive
proof, but may be proved by cirSimilar
cumstantial evidence."
statements appear in Smith v.
United States, 157 Fed. 721, 728
(C. C. A. 8th, 1907) (conspiracy
to deprive certain citizens of their
rights); Feigenbutz v. United
States, 65 F. (2d) 122, 124 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1933) (conspiracy to violate
National Prohibition Act); People
v. Cohn, supra (conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses).
There is even authority for convicting a person who has been only
indirectly connected with the conspiracy. In Tomplain v. United
States, 42 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A.
5th, 1930), the court said: "Where
a conspiracy is established but
slight evidence connecting a defendant therewith may still be substantial, and if so, sufficient."
Conspiracy has become a sort of
"catch-all" to punish all kinds of
combinations considered socially
dangerous. Chief among its uses
in early times in this country was
against labor disturbers. Fischer
v. State, 101 Wis. 23, 70 N. W. 594
(1898)
(threats of violence);
Loewe v. Calif. State Fed. of Labor,
139 F. 71 (1905) (boycott); Franklin Union v. People, 220 IML 355,
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77 N. E. 176 (1906). Since the tempted to illustrate this standard
by comparing reasonable doubt to
determination of what is a conspiracy is largely a question of fact, the doubt which a juror might
have as to whether a price offered
we find that "the law of conspiracy
certainly is in a very unsettled for his property was as much as he
could hope to obtain. The jl1ry restate. The decisions have gone on
no distinctive principle nor are turned a verdict of guilty and
they always consistent." Justice judgment was entered accordingly.
Gibson in Mifflin v. Common- The above instruction was assigned
as error. On appeal, reversed.
wealth, 5 Watts S. 461 (Pa. 1845).
Most of the evidence in this case Held: Such an instruction is erwas circumstantial; much of it roneous as practically eliminating
tended but indirectly to implicate the doctrine of reasonable doubt.
the defendants. But taken as a Paddock v. United States, 79 F.
(2d) 872 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
whole it seems clearly to establish
Under Anglo-American law in
that defendants actively participated in the conspiracy to aid in criminal cases every man is prethe escape and concealment of the sumed to be innocent until he is
prisoner, Nash. The instant case is proved to be guilty. It is the duty
thus an excellent example of the of the court to instruct the jurors
use to which a prosecutor may put that to convict, they must be satisconspiracy statutes. All members *fled of the defendant's guilt beyond
of a gang of criminals who con- a reasonable doubt. An instructributed in any way to the perpe- tion on reasonable doubt that has
tration of crime may be brought received frequent sanction and has
to justice, without the necessity of been quoted many times is found
proving that each was present at in Commonwealth v. Webster, 59
the time the conspiracy culmiMass. 320 (1850).
Reasonable
nated in murder, robbery or other doubt, the court said, is "that state
specific offense. See also Note of the case, which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of
(1935) 26 J. Crim. L. 278.
the evidence, leaves the minds of
RUSSELL BUNDESEN.
the jurors in that condition that
they cannot say that they feel an
abiding conviction, to a moral cerINSTRUCTIONS TO JURY-REASONtainty, of the truth of the charge.
ABLE DOUBT-"BusINEss TEST.". . . The evidence must establish
In a prosecution for
[Federal]
attempt to evade the income tax, the truth of the fact to a reasonafter the case had been submitted able and moral certainty; a certo the jury, there was a request tainty that convinces and directs
for further instruction on reason- the understanding, and satisfies the
able doubt. The court thereupon reason and judgment. . . . This
instructed the jury that if they we take to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
were convinced of defendant's
An instruction sometimes apguilt to that degree of certainty
upon which they would act in their proved is "there is a reasonable
own important affairs, then they doubt when the evidence fails to
were convinced beyond a reason- satisfy the jury with such certainty
that a prudent man would feel
able doubt. The court then at-
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safe in acting upon it in his own
important affairs." This definition, designated the "business test,"
has been accepted to some degree
in a number of jurisdictions.
Some states permit reasonable
doubt to be compared to the doubt
which arises in the "important" or
"graver" transactions of life. Peopie v. Lenhardt, 340 Ill. 538, 173
N. E. 155 (1930); Martin v. State,
67 Neb. 36, 93 N. W. 161 (1903);
Commonwealth v. Green, 292 Pa.
579, 141 AtI. 624 (1928); State v.
Harras, 25 Wash. 416, 65 Pac. 774
(1901); State v. Watson, 103 W.
Va. 482, 138 S. E. 117 (1927) (instruction unnecessary but not reversible error). Other jurisdictions consider such a standard too
low a degree of care and require
that this test be applied only to
the "most important" affairs or to
matters of the "highest importance." Averheart v. State, 158
Ark. 639, 238 S. W. 620 (1922);
Beneks v. State, 196 N. E. 73 (Ind.
3935); State v. Crockett, 59 Ore.
76, 65 Pac. 447 (1901) (instruction
undesirable but not so misleading
as to constitute reversible error);
Nelson v. Commonwealth, 153 Va.
909, 150 S. E. 407 (1929); see People v. Albers, 137 Mich. 678, 691,
100 N. W. 908, 913 (1904). Most
courts that uphold the use of the
business test feel that it elucidates
the expression of reasonable doubt
and aids the ordinary juror to a
proper comprehension of what is
implied by the term. See Commonwealth v. Andrews, 234 Pa. 597,
608, 83 Atl. 412, 415 (1912).
However, other jurisdictions
wholly reject the business test.
Burchleld v. State, 123 So. 281
(Ala. App. 1929); Nelms v. State,
123 Ga. 575, 51 S. E. 588 (1905);
Jane v. Commonwealth, 59 Ky. 30
(1859); People v. Montlake, 172 N.

Y. S. 102 (1918); State v. Morris,
41 Wyo. 128, 283 Pac. 406 (1929).
The refusal to apply the test is
based on two grounds. The first
is that the judgment of reasonable
men in the affairs of life, however
important, is influenced and controlled merely by a preponderance
of the evidence. In criminal cases
something more is required, and
consequently, use of the business
test is likely to lead jurors to believe wrongly that they may convict on a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Morris, supra.
The other ground for rejection is
that the phrase "reasonable doubt"
is self-explanatory and any definition tends only to confuse the jury
and render uncertain an expression which, standing alone, is intelligible and certain. See Nelms
v. State, supra. The federal rule,
as set forth in the leading case of
Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430 (1886),
approves an instruction using the
business test when it is part of the
more elaborate charge that "if you
can reconcile the evidence with
any reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defendant's innocence you should do so and in that
case find him not guilty." Accord:
Shepherd v. United States, 236
Fed. 73 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916).
For the jury to determine guilt
by the business test is undesirable.
It should not be reversible error
when confined to important issues
and when qualified by instruction.
When it is the kind of judgment
used in trivial commercial transactions it undermines reasonable
doubt and should be cause for reversal. "Reasonable doubt" is clear
and attempts to define it may lead
to confusion. See 5 WIGMORE, EviDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2497.
GERTRUDE SIEBER.
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